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INTRODUCTION
][N oRDER to end the present crisis, to establish ... confidence and
trust..., to create a campus environment that encourages students
to exercise free and responsible citizenship.. ."I So ran the preamble of a
December 8, 1964, statement on the free speech controversy by the
Berkeley Division of the University of California Academic Senate. The
crisis has ended, but despite substantial progress the other goals are not
yet achieved. The Berkeley campus still seeks viable principles of freedom and fairness, of academic inquiry and political disputation. In deciding to present a selection of views by law faculty members involved in the
free speech controversy, the editors of the CaliforniaLaw Review did not
wish to reopen old wounds just begun to heal, or to rekindle acrimonious
debate. We thought rather to provide a forum in which lawyers and law
teachers could address themselves to the problems that beset not just
Berkeley but all institutions of higher education. The reservations of
those who thought it too soon for restrained and enlightened dialogue,
we could not help sharing to some degree.
The free speech crisis at Berkeley is, analytically, cognate to any
hiatus in the normal modes of settling disputes. Lawyers have vested
interests in preserving those modes. First, of course, their financial and
professional well-being depends upon the need for advocates before
legislative and adjudicative tribunals. Second, one hopes more important,
lawyers are trained in procedures for settling disputes and they should
be astute to discover defects in existing procedures and to press for
methods to handle claims expeditiously and fairly. Third, the lawyer's
methodology-fact discrimination, analysis, orderly conclusion-drawing
1 Note 83 infra and accompanying text. The content of the resolution is the subject of
discussion by Professors OrNeil and Louisell and Dean Newman, infra this Symposium.
2
See, e.g., Professor Louisel's reservations about contributing. Louisell, Responding to
the December 8th Resolution: Of Politics, Free Speech, and Due Process, infra this
Symposium.
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-lends itself to reasoned consideration of a broader range of disputes
than reaches the courts. Fourth, lawyers, especially those who litigate
questions of constitutional law and federal-state relations, should be
sensitive to discrepancies between our fundamental ideas and our
regime of statutory, administrative, and case law, and quick to sense
conflicts between the overlapping normative orders of state and federal
law and policy. Here, too, is an analogy: The university makes its own
rules, but within the statutory and constitutional rules of the larger community.3 The university may punish certain acts committed on campus
which the larger community also holds to be criminal, but when ought it
to do so and when ought it to leave such matters to the criminal courts?
The dual questions of higher law overriding the academic scheme of
rules and of overlapping allocations of sovereignty arise, therefore, in
the university. The questions of procedural fairness, and of overriding
and overlapping normative orders are of continuing concern for lawyers
in the free speech controversy. In this collection of views, Professors
Heyman and Linde discuss academic rule making and adjudication.
Professor Sherry discusses the relationship of criminal law rules of the
larger community to the university's own disciplinary machinery and
summarizes the relevant considerations in making and enforcing campus
rules. Professors Louisell and O'Neil discuss the December 8, 1964, resolution of the Academic Senate at Berkeley4 which lent support to certain
of the aims of the Free Speech Movement. Dean Newman has provided
"Recollections, Overview, and Response to Professor Louisell."
We have included, in addition, a student comment on a statute passed
partly in response to the controversy. Introduced by Assemblyman Don
Mulford of Berkeley, new section 602.7 of the California Penal Code
provides that the Chief Campus Officer of each state college and University of California campus may request certain nonstudents to leave
the campus and upon their failure to do so order their arrest as trespassers."
This introduction seeks also to set out facts and documents relating
8 Granted, the impingement of state and federal constitutional and statutory rules will
be greater upon a state university than upon a private one. The state university relies on the

legislature for its funds. Also, its action is "state action" and it must observe constitutional
guarantees. However, the concept of state action has expanded recently, and a private uni-

versity may well find its connection with the state makes its action "state action." See, e.g.,
Evans v. Newton, 86 Sup. Ct. 486 (1966); Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951
(5th Cir. 1965).
4 Reproduced and discussed at text accompanying note 83 infra.
5Assembly Bill 1920, passed as an emergency measure effective immediately and signed
into law on June 1, 1965, Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 475, is discussed in Comment, 54 CAL. L.
Rav. 132 (1966).
6 CAL.. PEN. CoVE § 602.7.
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to the controversy. To recapitulate in detail would be largely redundant,
as the critical facts have been set forth elsewhere. 7 We have limited ourselves to an attempt to clarify the issues discussed in the faculty contributions by alluding to and quoting from the principal sources to which
they refer. In addition, we have set forth some of the legal arguments
advanced during the trial of the nearly eight hundred students arrested
in the administration building sit-in of December 1964. We have, moreover, appended a bibliography of material on academic freedom,
academic due process, and on the events at Berkeley.
I
SOME FACTS AND DOCUMENTS

A.

1957 to 19648

Early in 1957 the long silence of the early and mid-fifties at Berkeley
began to end with the formation of TASC-Toward An Active Student
Community-a liberal organization concerned mainly with civil liberties
issues.9 In the fall of 1957, TASC regrouped as Slate, the name of the
latter denoting that it ran a slate of candidates for student body office. 10
From 1957 to 1964, the campus went through periodic crises dealing with
student government, 1 freedom of expression on campus,'" compulsory
participation in ROTC,13 and student political activity off the campus. 4
The beginning of the Southern sit-in movement in February of 1960
intensified campus interest in "demonstration politics" as students
picketed Berkeley stores of Woolworth's and Kress', two of the dime
store chains whose Southern lunch counters refused to serve Negroes. 5
7

For a chronology of events and a collection of documents, see California Monthly,
Feb. 1965, pp. 4-96; id., June 1965, pp. 52-56; id., July-August 1965, pp. 48-63. Most of
the material from the CaliforniaMonthly appears in THE BEREXLEY STUDENT REVOLT: FACTS
AND INTERPRETATIONS (Lipset and Wolin eds. 1965).
8 Some of the relevant history appears in the Ballantine paperback, HoRowrrz, STUDENT
(1962). See also Heirich & Kaplan, Yesterday's Discord, California Monthly, Feb. 1965, p. 20.
The Heirich-Kaplan article does contain some errors, however. One is p6inted out in California Monthly, June 1965, p. 4. Another appears in their article at page 26. The authors'
version of a 1960 student body election is contradicted by The Daily Californian, Oct. 14,
1960, p. 14, col. 1.
9 Heirich & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 24; see HoRowrz, op. cit. supra note 8, at 17-22.
10 Ibid.
11 See HOROWITZ, op. cit. supra note 8, at 29-36; Heirich & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 24.
12
Heirich & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 24.
'SHoRowITz, op. cit. supra note 8, at 22-28, 115-21.
141d. at 46-104, detailing the May 1960 demonstrations against the House Committee
on Un-American Activities and the subsequent controversy over their character and political
orientation.
1
Heirich & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 26.
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The execution of Caryl Chessman on May 2, 1960,0 and the student
demonstration against the House Committee on Un-American Activities
on May 12, 13, and 14, 1960,'1 focussed national attention on Berkeley
as an activist center. 18
In this period it had been the custom of student groups to hold outdoor meetings at or near the entrance to the Berkeley campus, and to
set up card tables there soliciting donations, inviting interest from
prospective members, and publicizing activities. 9
This activity has rightly been regarded as a precursor to the events
of Fall 1964-Berkeley's students had garnered a reputation as active
and concerned with political issues. Some, such as Governor Brown,
spoke favorably of the student activists.20 Others, such as Senator Hugh
Burns of the California State Committee on Un-American Activities,
sought to identify the students and their protests with Communist
organizations and doctrine.2
Were one to seek to identify more specifically the forerunners of the
free speech controversy, he would have to mention two sets of circumstances. First, beginning in the fall of 1963, San Francisco Bay Area
civil rights groups had picketed and demonstrated against employment
discrimination in the Bay Area food and hotel industries. 22 Their actions
culminated in sit-ins at San Francisco drive-in restaurants, at the Sheraton-Palace Hotel in San Francisco, and in the showrooms of San
Francisco auto dealers. More than six hundred arrests were made.2 3 In
16 HoRowrrz, op. cit. supra note 8, at 36-40.
17 See note 14 supra, and material there cited.
18 The Horowitz book, op. cit. supra note 8,was one example of the national interest.
For other indications of interest, see SENATE FACr-FINDING SUBCOMB. ON UN-AmERICAN
AcivrrEs, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ELEVENTH REPORT 15-97 (1961), which also gives the
Committee's version of the events of 1959-61; Rexroth, The Students Take Over, 191 TiH
NATION 4 (1960); On Growing Up Absurd, The Progressive, May 1961, p. 11. J. Edgar
Hoover published a widely-quoted account of the May 1960 San Francisco demonstrations,
and the House Committee on Un-American Activities issued a film. See HOROWITZ, op. Cit.
supra note 8, at 81-104.
19 This was a finding of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student Conduct, in its report of
November 12, 1964. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student Conduct, California
Monthly, Feb. 1965, p. 83. Dean Towle, in issuing regulations concerning campus political
activity on September 14, 1964, conceded that political activity had gone on relatively
unhindered prior to her announcement. Chronology of Events, Three Months of Crisis,
California Monthly, Feb. 1965, p. 36. The Chronology appeared in three issues, those of
February, June, and July-August 1965, and hereinafter is cited simply as Chronology with
month of issue and page.
20 WARSHAW, THE TROUBLE IN BERKELEY 90 (1965), quoting a 1961 speech.
21

SENATE FAcr-FiNDING

Suacoir.

ON UN-AMmIcAN

AcTIvITIs,

CALoRNIA

op. cit. supra note 18, at 15-98; SENATE FACT-FnDInG SUrncor.
ON UNAmERIcAc
Acrnvnmzs, CAL.FORNIA LEGISLATURE, TwEmrr REPORT 177-94 (1963).
22
Heirich & Kaplan, supra note 8, at 30-31; WARsHAw, op. cit. supra note 20, at 8-9.
23
Ibid. For details of the arrests and subsequent trials, see 9 CIvIL LBERTIES DocKET
41, 80-81 (1964); 10 id. 96 (1965).
LEGisLATuRE,
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5

the summer of 1964 the supporters of William Scranton's candidacy
for the Republican nomination for President organized groups of students
at Berkeley to work on the Scranton campaign. 4 Later in the summer of
1964 and continuing into the fall, students from Berkeley were among
those picketing the Oakland Tribune-publishedby former U.S. Senator
William F. Knowland, a leading figure in the 1964 Goldwater campaign
-alleging that the paper discriminated against Negroes in its hiring
practices 5 The political activities of students in the community focussed
critical community attention upon the Berkeley student body.
A second precipitating factor was the students' attitude. Local
campaigns on issues of civil rights involved many students. As the 1964
elections drew nearer, students of all points of view began to organize
groups to support this or that candidate or issue: the Republican
nomination contest, and later the Presidential election, Proposition 14which invalidated California's fair housing legislation-and the contests
for state and federal elective offices 6 Students of all persuasions wanted
to speak out. The community was concerned. As Chancellor Strong later
said to the Academic Senate: "The situation was brought to a head by
the multiplied activity incident to the primary election [June 1964],
the Republican Convention, and the forthcoming fall elections.112 7
On September 14, Dean of Students Katherine Towle issued a letter
to student organizations, setting forth rules governing the use of University property in general, and the twenty-six foot strip of sidewalk at
the University entrance in particular. 2 The controversy began with that
letter.
B. Issues of the Controversy
The issues were four: the content of campus rules relating to speech
and political activity; campus procedures for adjudicating violations of
campus rules; the relation between campus rules and the criminal law;
and, the role of the faculty.
1. The Content of Campus Rules
Dean Towle's letter of September 14 set the tone:
"Provisions of the policy of The Regents concerning 'Use of University Facilities' will be strictly enforced in all areas designated as
2

4 WARSHAW, op. cit. supra note 20, at 11-13.
25 Id. at 18-20. Indeed, pressure from the Tribune may well have precipitated Administration restriction of on-campus advocacy. See id. at 17.
28See DRuPER, BElEnY: THE NEw STuDiN REVOLT 22-28 (1965).
27 Chronology, Feb. 1965, p. 36, quoting from a report to the Academic Senate dated
October 26, 1964.
28Id. at 35-36.
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property of the Regents, including the 26-foot strip of brick walkway
at the campus entrance on Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue ....
"Specifically,"... "Section III of the... policy... prohibits the
use of University facilities 'for the purpose of soliciting party membership or supporting or opposing particular candidates or propositions in
local, state or national elections,' except [the Chancellor may make
facilities available for candidates or their representatives to speak] ...
'where the audience is limited to the campus community.' [The Chancellor may make similar provisions respecting speakers supporting or
opposing propositions.]....
". ....
Section IV of the policy states further that University
facilities 'may not be used for the purpose of raising money to aid
projects not directly connected with some authorized activity of the
University. .. '
"....
[Students may present speakers on a 'special event' basis,
provided rules respecting notice and sponsorship are respected, and]
... The 'Hyde Park' area in the Student Union Plaza is also available
for impromptu, unscheduled speeches by students and staff.
"..... [Handbills may be distributed at the campus entrance, but]
posters, easels and card tables will not be permitted in this area because
of interference with the flow of (pedestrian) traffic. University facilities
may not, of course, be used to support or advocate off-campus political
or social action."'20
Initially, the principal points of contention centered on the ban on
card tables at the campus entrance, the students taking the view that
reasonable rules respecting the number of permissible tables would be
sufficient to prevent blockage of pedestrian traffic."0 Second, students
urged that they be permitted to distribute material relating to the current
election campaign.8 1 Third, they wanted to collect donations to finance
such activity.2 Fourth, they wanted to advocate off-campus activity from
picketing to public meetings."8
Dean Towle later modified certain of the rules, 84 and Chancellor
Strong issued a "reinterpretation of Regents' policy" which further met
29 Ibid.
SOId. at 36-37.
8lIbid.
82 Ibid.
833 bid. The restriction on advocacy was not confined to students. Dean Towle announced that even nonstudents invited to appear on campus could not advocate political
or social action. Id. at 37. Dean Towle, on October 28, 1964, restated the distinction between
permissible and impermissible debate. "A speaker may say, for instance, that there is going
to be a picket line at such-and-such a place, and it is a worthy cause, and he hopes people
will go. But, he cannot say, 'I'll meet you there and we'll picket.'" Id. at So. A special
assistant to Vice Chancellor Alex Sherriffs said that the ban was to discourage "advocacy
of action without thought." Id. at 37. This rationale is difficult to understand as the ban
made no distinction between advocators who thought and those who did not-it prohibited
them all.
84
Id. at 37.
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certain student requests. 5 Students could advocate yes or no votes on
electoral propositions and could advocate votes for candidates. Bumper
strips, campaign literature, and buttons could be distributed at the Bancroft-Telegraph entrance. The bans on advocacy of off-campus action
and collection of donations remainedV 6
On November 20, the Board of Regents passed the following resolution:
"1) The Regents restate the long-standing University policy as set
forth in Regulation 25 on student conduct and discipline that 'all
students and student organizations... obey the laws of the State
and the community ...'
"2) The Regents adopt the policy effective immediately that certain
campus facilities, carefully selected and properly regulated, may be
used by students and staff for planning, implementing or raising
funds or recruiting participants for lawful off-campus action, not
for unlawful off-campus action.1 37
The Free Speech Movement, stating that it had conferred with counsel
and on an informal basis with the Berkeley-Albany American Civil Liberties Union, restated its position in light of point two of the Regents'
resolution:
Civil liberties and political freedoms which are constitutionally
protected off campus must be equally protected on campus for all
persons. Similarly, illegal speech or conduct should receive no greater
protection on campus than off campus. The Administration, like any
other agency of government, may not regulate the content of speech
and political conduct. Regulations governing the time, place and
manner of exercising constitutional rights are necessary for the maintenance and proper operation of University functions ....
By making the distinction between advocating "lawful" and "unlawful" action, the Regents propose to regulate the content of speech
on campus. It is this distinction that is at the heart of FSM opposition to these regulations. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that
advocacy of unlawful conduct cannot constitutionally be punishedeven in the courts-so long as the advocacy will not clearly and
presently cause some substantial evil that is itself illegal. 38
The FSM statement further indicated that designation of certain areas
for the conduct of speech and political action, removed from the normal
flow of traffic, could not be justified. Such limits on the place where
speech may take place may be justified, the FSM argued, only if the
35

Id.at 38.
36 Ibid.
37Id. at 57. This concession followed two months of controversy. See id. at 35-57.
88 The Position of the Free Speech Movement on Speech and PoliticalActivity, California Monthly, Feb. 1965, p. 80.
8
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University could demonstrate that limiting access to the "desirable" open
areas was the only way to maintain the flow of traffic or to accomplish
other legitimate University ends. 9
The "free speech" issues in the controversy resolved into two, therefore: First, to what extent may the University regulate on-campus behavior of students and faculty directed toward organizing political or
social action in the surrounding community?4 ° Second, to what extent
may the University regulate speaking and leafleting in its walkways and
open spaces? The principal constitutional discussion must center, as
indicated in the contributions to this discussion, on the extent to which
a state university may impose more regulation than, say, a municipality
with respect to open spaces suitable for speech activities."
2. Adjudicatory Fairnessin Campus Discipline
Most campuses have institutional means of dealing with violations
of campus rules. The procedures followed by administration officials at
Berkeley during the fall of 1964 were of concern to the students at least
equally with the issues of freedom of speech.
The first invocation of University sanctions concerned student operation of card tables at the south entrance to the campus on September 29
and 30. Eight students were cited for'operating such tables either without applying for permits to do so, or after permits had been denied, and
for soliciting donations and advocating off-campus political action.4 2 In
addition, on the evening of September 30, until 2:40 a.m. on October 1,
a number of students-perhaps three hundred-sat in the halls of the administration building.43 An Academic Senate committee found after hearings that they did not block doors or hallways, and did not engage in an
unusual amount of noise for a group in such a small space.4"
A second imposition of University discipline concerned events on
October 1, 1964. Two deans and a campus policeman approached a
Congress of Racial Equality card table about noon and demanded that
S9 Ibid. The full statement is set forth in TnT BRXmFY STUENT REVOLT: FACTs AND
INTERPRETATIONS 201-04 (Lipset and Wolin eds. 1965).

40 This statement must be qualified insofar as student religious organizations also felt
that the September 14 rules restricted their freedom to operate in the University community. See, e.g., the statement of The Inter-Faith Staff Workers and Student Leaders,
Chronology, Feb. 1965, p. 44.
41 The discussion at this writing centers on Provisional Regulations issued by Chancellor
Roger Heyns on September 16, 1965.
42 Chronology, Feb. 1965, pp. 38-39; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student
Conduct, California Monthly, Feb. 1965, p. 84.
43 Chronology, supra note 42, at 39; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student
Conduct, supra note 42, at 84.
44
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student Conduct, supra note 42, at 84.
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the nonstudent seated there soliciting funds identify himself. He refused
and was arrested for trespassing. University police moved a police car
into the area and installed the arrestee, later identified as Jack Weinberg,
in it. Students surrounded the car and used its top as headquarters for a
rally which lasted until the evening of October 2. Simultaneously, a
number of students-perhaps five hundred-sat in the hallway outside
the Dean of Students' Office in the administration building.45 The building
adjoins the walkway at the south entrance to the campus.
The December 2 and 3 sit-in in the administration building might
also have led to University discipline, but on December 7, University
President Clark Kerr announced that no such action would be taken.40
Therefore, the two events which provoked controversy were the University and faculty responses to the disciplinary problems raised by the
September 29-30 card table incidents, and the October 1-2 police caradministration building episode.
(a) The September 29-30 Episode.--Five of the eight students cited
were asked to appear at the Dean of Students' Office at 3:00 p.m. on
September 30. Four hundred students signed petitions saying that they
too had manned tables. A spokesman for the students ordered to appear,
other students cited for manning tables but not ordered to appear, and
the petition signers told the Dean of Students that the cited students
would not appear unless all the petition signers were also proceeded
against. The Dean declined to accept this condition."
The Dean conferred with Chancellor Strong, who at 11:45 p.m.,
without notice to the students involved, issued a statement announcing
the indefinite suspension from the University of the cited students. 48 As
an ad hoc committee of the Academic Senate later concluded:
The procedures followed were unusual. Normally, penalties of any
consequence are imposed only after hearings before the Faculty
Student Conduct Committee. Such procedure was not followed here
with the result that the students were suspended without a hearing.
This must be set against the extraordinary circumstances created by
the sit-in [of the four hundred students asking that all cases be considered together] and the cited students' refusal to confer with Dean
Williams except on a condition unacceptable to him. One of Dean
Williams' purposes in asking for such conference was in fact to explain
the hearing procedures available before the Faculty Student Conduct
Committee, although this purpose had not been explained to the five
students involved. Nevertheless, and in hindsight, it would have been
more fitting to announce that the students were to be proceeded
45 Chronology, supra note 42,
4
6 Id. at 67.
47
48

at 39-44.

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student Conduct, supra note 42, at 84.
Ibid.
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against before the Faculty Committee
rather than levying summary
49
punishments of such severity.
The confusion in the initiation of charges was compounded by the
text of an agreement signed by University President Clark Kerr and the
free speech spokesmen on the evening of October 2. That agreement
provided that the cases of the suspended students would be submitted
"within one week to the Student Conduct Committee of the Academic
Senate.""5 Unfortunately, there has never been such a committee, and
the Academic Senate had no meeting scheduled within the one week time
limit.5 1 Chancellor Strong submitted the cases to the regular Faculty
Committee on Student Conduct, which is appointed by the University
Administration.52
This decision was rescinded after vigorous protest from the students
concerned, and the Academic Senate was asked, by President Kerr and
Chancellor Strong on October 15 to set up an ad hoc committee to consider the suspensions, the committee to be advisory to the administration.5" The committee's procedures were worked out by the committee
members, chaired by Boalt Hall Professor Ira M. Heyman and included
the right to counsel.14 The Committee decided that it "was not competent" to consider the students' claims that the regulations violated the
first amendment. 5 It did, however, consider the fairness of the procedures
followed by the Chancellor and Dean Williams in summoning the students
and suspending them.50
The Committee concluded:
On the one hand, it seems clear that the students violated regulations
and interpretations of regulations. That their behavior was motivated
by high principle may influence the severity of punishment recom49 Id. at 84-85.
50 Chronology, supra note 42, at 43, quoting in full the text of the October.2 agreement
and setting out the circumstances surrounding it.
51
Id. at 45.
52

1d. at 44-45.

53 Id. at 45-46, 48.
54

1d. at 48. The Committee's provision of the right to counsel and to a tape recorded

transcription of the proceedings was specified in the unanimous resolution of the Academic
Senate on October 15, 1964. Ibid. The unanimity of the Senate is noted. The resolution is
set forth in full at the beginning of the Committee's report, which is reprinted in full in
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student Conduct, supra note 42, at 82-87, and in
T=a BERKELEY STUDENT REVOLT: FAcTs AND INTERPRETATIONs 560-74 (Lipset and Wolin

eds. 1965).
55 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Student Conduct, supra note 42, at 83.
56Id. at 84-85, 87. The Committee does not make explicit that it is considering "fairness"; it notes, however, that the procedures used by the Chancellor and the Dean are

subject to "serious criticism," and criticizes those procedures on administrative due process
grounds. Id. at 87.
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mended, but does not cause the violations to disappear. On the other
hand, the procedure by which the University acted to punish these
wrongdoings is subject to serious criticism. The relevant factors are:
first, the vagueness of many of the relevant regulations; second, the
precipitate action taken in suspending the students sometime between
dinner time and the issuance of the press release at 11:45 p.m. [on
September 30]; third, the disregard of the usual channel of hearings
for student offenses-notably hearings by the Faculty Committee on
Student Conduct; fourth, the deliberate singling out of these students
(almost as hostages) for punishment despite evidence that in almost
every case others were or could have been easily identified as performing similar acts; and fifth, the choice of an extraordinary and novel
penalty--"indefinite suspension"--which is nowhere made explicit in
the regulations, and the failure to reinstate the students temporarily
pending actions taken on the recommendations of this committee....
....
We have enumerated the felt shortcomings in the confident
faith that the University Administration will be as desirous as we are of
correcting them. 57

(b) October 1-2.-On November 28, Chancellor Strong sent letters
to the homes of two student leaders-Mario Savio and Arthur Goldberg
-notifying them that the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct would
consider his charges that they violated University rules on October 1
and 2 and would recommend what punishment, if any, should be infficted.5 8 The students were informed, "You may be represented by
counsel at the hearing.15 9 The letter contained a fairly detailed statement of the conduct that was alleged to have violated University rules. 0
The Free Speech Movement protested reinstitution of proceedings
against the students.61 Chancellor Strong said that his action was justified
in that the Ad Hoc Academic Senate Committee had refrained from
considering the students' behavior on October 1 and 2.02
In fact, the students were never to appear before the faculty Committee, for President Kerr and the chairmen of all academic depart57 Ibid.
58 Chronology, supra note 42, at 58.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. Mario Savio and Arthur Goldberg were charged with leading a group of demonstrators that kept a police car trapped for thirty-two hours. Savio was charged with
leading and encouraging demonstrators in blocking access to and egress from the Dean of
Students' Office, and with biting a named policeman on a described portion of the said
policeman's body. Goldberg was additionally charged with threatening a named police officer.
Ibid. The letter did not, apparently, specify the provisions of campus rules which were

alleged to have been violated by the above conduct.
61 "The action violates the spirit of the Heyman Committee [the Ad Hoc Committee
on Student Conduct] report and can only be seen as an attempt to provoke another October
2." Id. at 59, quoting from a statement of the Free Speech Movement Steering Committee.
02 Id. at 59, quoting from a statement of Chancellor Strong rejecting Free Speech Movement demands that the charges be dropped.
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ments at Berkeley issued a statement on December 7 that the University
would not act against students for any actions taken prior to December
2 and 3, but would leave such matters to the courts. 8
(c) Retrospect on Adjudication.-The controversy leading to the
appointment of the Ad Hoc Academic Senate Committee, the procedural
difficulties attendant upon the suspensions of October 30, and the controversy which surrounded the procedural aspects of campus political
regulation gave way to a focus upon two major issues: First, what
procedures ought a committee to follow in considering discipline of
students-right to counsel, privilege to remain silent, the administrative
law principle of exclusivity of the record, "4 cross-examination, and so
forth? Second, in what proportions ought student, faculty, and administration representatives to comprise the committee? These matters were
considered in the December 8 resolution of the Berkeley Division of the
Academic Senate, which is set out below. 5 They are also the subject of
Professor Heyman's, Professor Linde's, and Professor Sherry's contributions to the discussion below.
3. The University's Rules and the Community's Rules
Questions *of free speech and of procedural fairness are largely constitutional in nature. The accommodation of the ofttimes overlapping
normative orders of the community and the university is more a question
of wisdom and judgment than of obeisance to an overriding set of positive rules. Professor Sherry, drawing on his experience as attorney,
legislative draftsman in the Revision of the Penal Code, and experienced
law teacher and faculty member, discusses these questions in detail.
Our purpose is to present the conflicting views which emerged during
the controversy.
The positions began to crystallize at a meeting of an advisory committee on campus political activity on November 7, 1964. At that meeting,
the administration representative, Dean Frank Kidner, offered the following proposal: "'If acts unlawful under California or Federal law directly
result from advocacy, organization or planning on the campus, the
students and organization involved may be subject to such disciplinary
63 Id. at 67.
6
4 This principle requires that the final decision maker not hear ex parte evidence unless

the opposite side is given a chance to know its content and to respond. Since the committees,
both established and ad hoc, that heard charges against students during the free speech controversy were only advisory to the Chancellor, the problem would be raised if the Chancellor
consulted other information outside the record in making the final disposition of cases. The
principle of exclusivity appears as §§ 5(c) and 7(d) of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act, 60 Stat. 240, 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1004(c), 1006(d) (1964).
65 See text accompanying note 83 infra.
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action as is appropriate and conditioned upon a fair hearing as to the
appropriateness of the action taken.' ,,6
In the ensuing discussion, Dean Kidner stated that the finding of
illegality of the off-campus acts need not be made by a court of law,
but that the University disciplinary authorities could make that finding
07
themselves
The student representatives countered with this proposal: "In the
area of first amendment rights and civil liberties, the University may
impose no disciplinary action against members of the University community and organizations. In this area, members of the University community and organizations are subject only to the civil authorities.""8
The faculty members of the advisory committee later issued a report
containing the following proposal for accommodating University rules and
criminal laws: "The on-campus advocacy, organization or planning of
political or social action .. .may be subject to discipline where this

conduct directly results in judicially-found violations of California or
Federal criminal law; and the group or individual can fairly be held
responsible for such violations under prevailing legal principles of accountability.""9
Thus, the faculty position would have permitted discipline, but only
after a court had found the off-campus acts illegal-whether this court
could be a court of first instance or whether the University would have to
abide the results of appeals was not specified. Further, the "prevailing
legal principles" apparently referred to such tests of illegal advocacy as
the "clear and present danger" test 7° and to such principles as the general
71
criminal rules on aiding and abetting and principal and accessory.
At the Board of Regents meeting on November 20, 1964, the Board
prohibited advocacy of unlawful off-campus action but did not adopt
'
any resolution on discipline for such advocacy.72
06Chronology, supra note 42, at 51-52.
67 Id. at 52.

68 Ibid.
69 Id. at 54. This proposal was presented in a somewhat different form on November 7
by Professor
Sanford Kadish of Boalt Hall. Id. at 52.
70
The "clear and present danger" test has found its principal use not so much in cases
involving the responsibility of an advocator for an act advocated, but in cases wherein the
question is whether the act of advocacy may be punished upon a showing of the circumstances in which it was committed, irrespective of its consequences. See, e.g., Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
71The general federal rules for criminal complicity short of commission of a principal
offense appear in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 (aiding and abetting), 3 (accessory after the fact). The
California rules appear in California Penal Code §§ 30 (parties to crime), 31 (defining
principals broadly), 32 (accessories), 33 (punishment for accessories), 663-65 (attempt in
general), 653f (solicitation for certain major crimes).
72 Chronology, supra note 42, at 57.
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The Free Speech Movement responded to the Regents' action with a
statement of its own views on advocacy, but also included a comprehensive statement of its views on the relation between the University disciplinary proceedings and the civil courts:
Under the November 20th regulations, if the Chancellor accuses a
student of advocating an unlawful act, the student and his sponsoring
organization are liable to punishment by the University. A student so
accused may appear before the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct, whose members are appointed by the Chancellor, and whose
opinions are only advisory to him.
The Free Speech Movement considered this to be unconstitutional
and unwise for the following two reasons.
(1) Since such a procedure allows the Chancellor to assume the
role of prosecutor, judge and jury simultaneously, the students have no
confidence that the final verdict will be fair. In fact, the history of the
treatment of civil liberties cases by the campus administration reveals
an insensitivity to safeguarding such liberties.
...
. [T]he Free Speech Movement insists that the question
whether ... advocacy is legal or illegal must be left to the courts, which
are institutionally independent of the shifting pressures of the community. Moreover, the standard that the Chancellor is free to apply is
only one of "responsibility" of the act of advocacy for the act advocated, which is far more inclusive and vague than the "clear and present
danger" test....
(2) Even if complete mutual trust existed between the Administration and the student body, and even if the University attempted to
observe the requirements of due process, it would be impossible for it to
provide all of the safeguards of our judicial system, or otherwise to
fulfill the functions of a court. The points in controversy, relating to the
degree of responsibility of an act of advocacy for an act advocated, are
of such a delicate and complex nature that even the courts have not
built up wholly adequate precedents. Certainly, then, a nonjudicial
body should be considered incompetent in this area.
On the other hand, the students' position that the courts alone have
jurisdiction does not in any way imply the creation of a haven for
illegal activity on the campus. On the contrary, it involves just the
opposite of this-the removal of any special protection the University
may now afford, as well as any extra-legal punishment. The student
becomes subject to the same process of trial and punishment for illegal
acts that all other citizens must accept. 73
In the same statement, the FSM conceded that the University may
regulate the time, place, and manner as opposed to the "content" of
speech in order that "political activity and speech do not interfere with
73 The Position of the Free Speech Movement on Speech and Political Activity, California Monthly, Feb. 1965, p. 80. The same material appears in T=m BERKELEY STUDENT
REVOLT: FAcTS AND INTERPRETATiONs 202-03 (Lipset and Wolin eds. 1965).
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the formal educational functions of the University."74 Regulation would
presumably involve the creation of standards and the disciplining of
violators.
Since the fall of 1964, many events have taken place which have
sharpened the issue of the interaction of University and community rules
relating to speech and political organization. Advocacy of off-campus
action for a time gave way in the public spotlight to obscenity.5 While
few of the FSM leaders participated in the utterances which the University alleged to be obscene, most of them maintained their view that
such questions ought to be subjected to the test of the criminal law
and only to that test-that the University ought not to discipline the
students independently. 76 Too, the public pressures for University reprisals against students and faculty involved in the events since Septem77
ber 1964 have continued.
The relation between the University and the community in which it
lives and works remains a vexing problem for administrators, students,
faculties, voters, and politicians.
4. The Role of the Faculty
In all colleges and universities, members of the faculty bear a special
responsibility to instill respect for the academic values of intellectual
honesty, tolerance for the views of others, and academic freedom. Large
universities, such as the University of California, strive to ensure that
students have access to faculty members outside the classroom, for
purposes of discussion and debate. 78 Small universities are able to achieve
faculty-student contact more easily. In addition, faculty members are
sometimes said to influence the political views of their students.7 9 It has
been said that this is undesirable.8 0 Whether or not it is desirable, certainly faculty members' views, whether in the classroom or out of it,
74 The Position of the Free Speech Movement on Speech and Political Activity, supra
note 73, at 80. The same material appears in THE BERKELEY STuDENTREvoLT: FACTS AND
INTERPRETATioNs, op. cit. supra note 73, at 203.

75 See Chronology, June 1965, pp. 52-56.
76 Ibid.
77
See, e.g., statements and stories in the Oakland Tribune, alluded to and quoted from
id. at 53-54.
78 See Hochschild, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 26, 1966, p. 1, col. 1; see generally
Heyman, Tumult and Shouting Subside at Berkeley as Restraints on Students Are Eased,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1966, p. 47, col. 4.
79
E.g., Petersen, What Is Left at Berkeley?, in TiE BERKELEY STuDT REVOLT: FACTS
AND INTERPRETATiONS 367, 367-68 (Lipset and Wolin eds. 1965).
80
See SENATE FAcr-FmiNG Suacosns. oN Ux-Aummcw Acrivnrs, CAL oRNIA LEGISLArRvpE, ELEVENTH REPORT 70 (1961), referring to and protesting "the practice of tolerating
members of the faculty to leave the classroom, climb up on the nearest pinnacle and harangue
students to their hearts content."
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are heard by students and are no doubt influential. This extends to views
on such diverse subjects as the current stage of learning on marginal
cost theory, physical chemistry, and the state of American democracy.
Finally, faculty members play a vital role in academic governance. At
the University of California, Berkeley, this role is predominantly played
through the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, of which most
faculty members are members."'
The Academic Senate's most significant action was taken on December 8, 1964, in the wake of the sit-in and arrests of the morning of
December 3. It passed two resolutions. The second of these set up an
Emergency Executive Committee, empowered to act in emergency situations such as the one then pending.8 2 The first, and more controversial,
dealt with the substantive issues of the crisis, and is the subject of comment and criticism in the faculty contributions which follow.
In order to end the present crisis, to establish the confidence and
trust essential to the restoration of normal University life, and to create
a campus environment that encourages students to exercise free and
responsible citizenship in the University and in the community at large,
the Committee on Academic Freedom of the Berkeley Division of the
Academic Senate moves the following propositions:
1. That there shall be no University disciplinary measures against
members or organizations of the University community for activities
prior to December 8 connected with the current controversy over
political speech and activity.
2. That the time, place, and manner of conducting political activity
on the campus shall be subject to reasonable regulations to prevent
interference with the normal functions of the University; that the
regulations now in effect for this purpose shall remain in effect provisionally pending a future report of the Committee on Academic
Freedom concerning the minimal regulations necessary.
3. That the content of speech or advocacy should not be restricted
by the University. Off-campus political activities shall not be subject to
University regulation. On-campus advocacy or organization of such
activities shall be subject only to such limitations as may be imposed
under Section 2.
4. That future disciplinary measures in the area of political
activity shall be determined by a committee appointed by and responsible to the Academic Senate.
5. That the Division pledge unremitting effort to secure the adoption of the foregoing policies and call on all members of the University
community to join with the faculty in its efforts to restore the Uni88
versity to its normal functions.
81 See University of California, Manual of the Academic Senate 60, July 1965. Faculty
members
of less than two years' service may not vote. Ibid.
82
,Chronology,Feb. 1965, p. 69.
83
Reprinted in Chronology, Feb. 1965, p. 68; TBm B.RxKzrz STUDENT REVOLT: FAcTs
Am INTERPRETATIONS 180-81 (Lipset and Wolin eds. 1965).
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Of course the faculty had been active in many capacities prior to
December 8, and its activity has continued to this day. The December
8 resolution remains, however, a major point of controversy.
II
THE SPROUL SIT-IN: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND LEGAL THEORIES

A.

Mass Arrest and Problems

The morning of December 3, beginning at 3:45 a.m.; nearly 780 persons were arrested in the administration building-Sproul Hall-of the
Berkeley campus.8 4 The problems involved in arresting, booking, bailing,
trying, and sentencing such a number of defendants-even after- 101
pleaded nolo contendere and charges against five were dismissed-raise
serious questions for scholars of criminal justice administration. Some
problems of mass arrest and trial are discussed in the following letter
from Malcolm Burnstein, one of the attorneys who participated in the
trial:
As you know, almost 780 people were arrested in Sproul Hall between
early morning and late afternoon of December 3, 1964. Three-fourths
of them were charged with violations of Sections 602(o) [trespass in
a public building of a public agency], 409 [unlawful assembly], and
148 [resisting arrest] of the California Penal Code. About one-quarter
were not charged with the section 148 offense. The defense in the
Berkeley Municipal Court lasted until the end of the summer of 1965.
Almost all of the defendants were convicted of the trespass charge and
those who went limp upon arrest were, additionally, convicted of
resisting arrest. The convictions are now on appeal to the Appellate
Division of the Alameda County Superior Court and what I have to say
in this letter will, of course, be controlled by the ethical problems of
discussion of a case still before the courts.
Within the limits allowed to me, however, I feel it might be interesting and useful to suggest some of the unusual problems which the
defense, and the courts, faced in dealing with this mass political trial.
It became apparent, rather early in the proceedings, that some of the
traditional criminal procedures were somewhat less than adequate in
dealing with 780 defendants, all accused of crimes arising out of a
single transaction.
Let me first suggest that while the development of the right to bail,
based upon the individual circumstances of the defendant and the
likelihood of his appearing in court at the times and places directed
is universally recognized as a progressive development in the criminal
law, such individual treatment may become, in the context of a mass
political arrest, a device for keeping people in jail long after they
might otherwise be entitled to their release. Each of the 780 defendants,
most of whom were students at the University of California with no
84 See Chronology, Feb. 1965, pp. 58-64. The details of trial and sentencing are summarized at 10 CiV. LIBERTIEs Docr 88-89, 133-34 (1965).
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criminal background of any kind, would, if arrested individually for
shoplifting (for example), have been OR'd [released on own recognizance] or released on minimal bail within a very short time after his
arrest. With 780 defendants arrested at the same time, the normal
practices and procedures would have resulted in delaying the release of
many or most of the defendants for days, or perhaps weeks. Some concession to the mass nature of the situation was urgently required and,
after almost a full day of discussion between defense, court and prosecution, bail for all defendants was uniformly reduced from the bail
schedules set for the offenses listed above. Almost all of the defendants
had to post more bail than they would have if arrested individuallybail totalled approximately $80,000-yet they were all released much
more rapidly than would have been the case if their situations had
been individually examined. The court turned down a defense request
for a mass OR order.
Along the same lines-the contrast between individual treatment
and mass treatment-a curious paradox in the legal system became
immediately apparent. Those who practice criminal law on a regular
basis have frequently praised judges who have adopted an approach to
criminal law tailored to the particular individual who stands before
them, rather than an approach based merely upon the abstract nature
of the crime. This is true whether the question is setting bail, granting
or denying probation, or imposing sentence. The Berkeley Municipal
Court was well known as a place where this progressive concept of
criminal justice was dominant. In the context of the sit-in case, however, some of the defendants grew to feel that some traditionally progressive concepts of criminal justice stood in the way of a rational and
fair appraisal and treatment of the event and the defendants. It should
be remembered that the defendants conducted an avowedly mass
action, in part due to a desire to protect some of their number who had
been singled out for administrative discipline by the University. When
juxtaposed to the desire on the part of the court to treat each person
individually-and inferentially, potentially differently-the defendants'
desires were frustrated and they became convinced that the judicial
system could not but treat their kind of protest unfairly. I think I may
ethically say that this problem never seemed to be adequately understood by the respective interests in this case. The defendants came to
feel, for instance, that the court was unwilling to grant the mass
political nature of their act when considering questions of disposition
other than trial, jury versus nonjury trial, or bail, but that the court did
recognize the mass political nature of the defendants' act when imposing sentence. This kind of problem will become increasingly important to courts and lawyers as the number of mass political arrests
and trials will, undoubtedly, continue to increase in this country.
Let me point out one other problem which arose out of the conflict between the mass nature of the proceedings and progressive,
though now traditional, legal principles. The right to have a jury
decide questions of fact in a criminal case has always been thought of
as a hard-won right of defendants. Examine, however, the concept of
the right to a jury trial in connection with the arrest of 780 defendants.
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Are they each entitled to a separate jury trial, given the possibility
that evidence relating to the conduct of certain defendants might
prejudice the jury against other defendants being tried at the same
time? Are they entitled to a single jury trial on the ground that all
defendants performed a single act and there should be only one decision
by a trier of fact as to the legality or illegality of their conduct? A
series of jury trials might well have resulted in exactly the same facts
being adjudged both legal and illegal depending upon the particular
jury sitting. The defendants involved in the University of California
sit-in had, as background evidence, the facts surrounding the 1964
San Francisco civil rights sit-ins and resulting trials. In those cases
husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, who performed the very same
act were tried before different juries with varying results on the question of guilt, and were sentenced by different judges with greatly
varying sentences. And, with a limited number of courts, some defendants awaited trial for many months.
Faced with this problem, the University of California defendants
argued that only a single jury would provide them with both their
right to a jury trial and due process of law. The prosecution argued that
a single jury trial involving so many defendants was unwieldy and impossible. The defense offered to discuss the possibility of stipulations
of fact so as to minimize the problems raised by the prosecution but the
prosecution stated that they felt that under no circumstances could a
trial that size be workable. The court denied the defense motion for a
single jury trial. The defense then attempted to explore possibilities
of a representative jury trial, under which only a limited number of
defendants would be tried before a jury, while the balance would submit their cases on the result of the single jury trial. The prosecution
objected, and the court would not allow such a procedure. A procedure
was finally worked out whereby 155 people went on trial before a judge
sitting without a jury. The other defendants were given the option of,
and it was understood that they would (and they did), submit their
cases to the same trial judge on the record to be made at that trial
with, perhaps, some additional factual stipulations. The defendants are,
however, raising as a point on appeal the denial of their right to trial
by jury, claiming that due process entitled them to either a single or a
representative jury trial.
I hope the foregoing gives you some idea of some of the difficulties
and problems which we faced in the criminal proceedings in conjunction
with the free speech dispute on the U.C. campus. These problems all,
in my opinion, merit serious consideration by law students and legal
scholars, as well as practicing lawyers.8 5
B. The Charges Against the Defendants
The defendants were charged with violations of California Penal
Code sections 409, 602 (o), and, in most cases, 148. They were acquitted
85

Letter to Michael E. Tigar from Malcolm Burnstein, Feb. 3, 1966, on file in office of
CaliforniaLaw Review.
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of the section 409 charge, and convicted under sections 602 (o) and
148.86

1. Unlawful Assembly
Section 409 makes it a misdemeanor to remain at the scene of "any
riot, rout, or unlawful assembly, after the same has been lawfully
warned to disperse ..... " Unlawful assembly, riot, and rout are defined
elsewhere in the Penal Code and the mode of notice and warning is also
prescribed by statute. The defendants' argument on statutory construction8 7 and constitutional"" grounds succeeded.
2. Trespass
California Penal Code section 602 (o) was enacted in 1963 :80
Every person who commits a trespass by either:
(o) Refusing or failing to leave a public building of a public
agency during those hours of the day or night when the building is
regularly closed to the public upon being requested to do so by a
regularly employed guard, watchman, or custodian of the public
agency owning or maintaining the building or property, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that such
person has no apparent lawful business to pursue;
is guilty of a misdemeanor.
As most defendants were convicted under section 602(o), serious
questions as to its validity and scope will be raised on appeal. These
questions include those of statutory construction: 0 Are the Regents, a
8610 C vi LIBETIES DoCT 133-34 (1965).
8T
The defendants argued that § 409 should be construed together with § 407 (defining
unlawful assembly), § 404 (defining riot), § 406 (defining rout), § 415 (disturbing the
peace), and its common law predecessors (see Comment, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 180 (1935)).
Thus the defendants argued that their conduct did not constitute a rout, riot, or unlawful
assembly, and did not disturb the public peace. The defendants also claimed that they had
not been "lawfully warned to disperse" within the meaning of § 409, citing People v.
Sklar, 111 Cal. App. Supp. 776, 292 Pac. 1068 (1930) and Penal Code § 726 (warning to
disperse). This summary of the defendants' argument is taken from Memorandum in Support of Motion for Pretrial Hearings and for Consolidation for Purposes of Pretrial Hearings, People v. Savio, Cr. Nos. 7468 through 7547, Municipal Court for the Berkeley-Albany
judicial District, 1965. Compare Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Demurrer, filed by the prosecution in the same case.
88 The defendants relied principally upon Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); City
of Rock Hill v. Henry, 375 US. 6 (1963), 376 U.S. 776 (1964); Fields v. South Carolina,
374 U.S. 44 (1963); and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). See Memorandum
in Support of Demurrer, People v. Savio, supra note 87.
89 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1299, p. 2826.
90 See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Pretrial Hearings and for Consolidation
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public corporation, a "public agency"; is Sproul Hall a "public building,"
given its use principally by students, faculty, and administrators; does
the locking of the doors of the building at night mean that the building
is "closed" to its public, the students; is the students' intention to protest, "lawful business"? There is the further question of whether the
legislature intended in passing section 602 (o) to punish conduct such as
that engaged in in Sproul HallY1
The constitutional questions raised in applying and interpreting section 602 (o) are similar to those encountered in applying many trespass
statutes. They are discussed in detail elsewhere in this issue of the
Review."2
3. Resisting Arrest
The defendants' principal claim in challenging their conviction under
Penal Code section 148 is that they did not "resist, delay or obstruct"
their arrest within the meaning of the statuteY s There is no California
criminal case directly in point, 4 but a New York court of first instance
has held that "going limp" on arrest is punishable resistance to the arresting officer. 5
Because the "going limp" technique is popular in civil rights arrests,
the issue will become of increasing importance.
for Purposes of Pretrial Hearings, People v. Savio, Cr. Nos. 7468 through 7547, Municipal
Court for the Berkeley-Albany Judicial District, 1965. See also Memorandum in Support
of Demurrer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Demurrer filed
in the same case.
91
The bill to enact § 602(o) contained language proscribing a much broader range of
conduct than is proscribed by the statute as it was finally passed. Assembly Bill 2411, Reg.
Sess. 1963. The bill was amended and limited, according to some of those who participated
in the legislative process, to make sure that it would not be applicable to a sit-in then going
on in the State Capitol Building. Interview with Coleman A. Blease, lobbyist for American
Civil Liberties Union, Feb. 6, 1966.
92See Comment, 54 CALF. L. REv. 132 (1966), discussing new Penal Code § 602.7,
which applies only to the University of California and California state colleges. See notes
5-6 supra and accompanying text.
93 CAy . PEN. CODE § 148: "Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs....
94
The case of People v. Wilson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 738, 37 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1964), involved
nonviolent resistance, but the defendant threatened the police with a rifle. In re Bacon, 240
A.C.A. 34 (1966), 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, opinion modified and rehearing denied, 240 A.CA.
323 (1966), held that evidence that the defendant went limp upon arrest was sufficient
to sustain a trial court finding that he violated Penal Code § 148. However, this was a
juvenile case and the sole question was whether the evidence sustained a trial court finding
that the defendant should be made a ward of the court under CAt.. W=LFARE & INs1'NS
CODE

§ 602.

95 People v. Martinez, 43 Misc. 2d 94, 250 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Crim. Ct. 1964). The case of
People v. Knight, 35 Misc. 2d 216, 228 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Magis. Ct. 1962), found that the
defendant resisted arrest, but in addition to going limp, Knight had pulled the officer's hand
away from his shoulder-a technical battery.
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CONCLUSION

There is a tension between thinking and doing, between explaining
the world and changing it. One year after the crisis at Berkeley, the
time for tendential bombast is passing and even the most ardent protagonists are seeking to draw lessons and conclusions in the spirit of rational inquiry. We think the articles which follow, written by law professors who participated in the months of crisis, are substantial contributions
to a reasoned search for viable principles of freedom and fairness.
Michael E. Tigart
t BA. 1962, University of California, Berkeley. Edltor-in-Chief, California Law Review.

